In this paper, we consider two-sided, many-to-one matching problems where agents on one side of the market (schools) impose some distributional constraints. The regional maximum quotas [Kamada and Kojima 2015] provide one such example, where a school belongs to a region, and each region has an upper bound on the number of assigned agents on the other side (students). Furthermore, minimum quotas [Fragiadakis et al. 2015] are relevant in many markets, e.g., school districts may need at least a certain number of students in each school in order for the school to operate. Yet another type of constraints takes the form of diversity constraints [Ehlers et al. 2014] . Public schools are often required to satisfy balance on the composition of students, typically in terms of socioeconomic status. Several mechanisms have been proposed for each of these various constraints [Ehlers et al. 2014; Fragiadakis et al. 2015; Kamada and Kojima 2015] , but previous studies have focused on tailoring mechanisms to specific settings, rather than providing a general framework.
they can contribute to the advance of practical market design by providing tools for organizing matching clearinghouses in practice. Kojima et al. [2014] show that in order to represent schools' preferences as an M ♮ -concave function, the family of contracts that satisfy hard distributional constraints must form a mathematical structure called a matroid [Murota 2003 ]. Usually, distributional constraints are imposed on a vector, where each element is the number of contracts accepted for each school, rather than on concrete contracts. The fact that the family of contracts forms a matroid corresponds to the fact that (i) the family of vectors forms an M ♮ -convex set, and (ii) it is hereditary, which means if a vector satisfies constraints, any vector that is smaller than it also satisfies constraints.
In this paper, we develop a mechanism that can handle more general distributional constraints than Kojima et al. [2014] . The only requirement we impose on distributional constraints is that the family of vectors that satisfy distributional constraints must be hereditary.
In a standard definition, a matching is stable if it is fair and nonwasteful. When distributional constraints are imposed, a stable matching may not exist. If we completely ignore fairness or nonwastefulness, we can employ trivial strategyproof mechanisms in our setting. More specifically, we can use the Serial Dictatorship mechanism (SD) to achieve nonwastefulness. In the SD, we assume a common priority ordering among students called a master list is given. Students are assigned sequentially according to the master list. A student s is allowed to be assigned to a school c if doing so would not cause any constraint violation. Then, s can choose her most preferred school within allowed schools. Also, we can use the Artificial Cap Deferred Acceptance (ACDA) mechanism to achieve fairness, i.e., we artificially lower the maximum quota of each school such that the DA obtains a set of contracts that satisfies all distributional constraints.
However, the limitations of these mechanisms are that the SD can be extremely unfair and the ACDA can be extremely wasteful (thus it sacrifices students' welfare too much). As a result, it would be difficult to apply these mechanisms in real application domains. In this paper, we develop a strategyproof and nonwasteful mechanism called Adaptive Deferred Acceptance (ADA) mechanism, which is "more fair" than the SD, and "less wasteful" than the ACDA. We show that we can apply this mechanism even if the distributional constraints do not satisfy the hereditary condition by applying a simple trick, assuming we can find a vector that satisfy the distributional constraints efficiently. Furthermore, we demonstrate the applicability of our model in actual application domains.
